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Abstract
This thematic issue shows how the interplays of secrecy and transparency have been a salient driver of institutional poli-
tics in EU foreign affairs. It offers a critical reading of the most recent developments in EU’s international negotiations, an
analysis of case law and empirical insights on public and institutional access to information. The Issue provides an interdis-
ciplinary understanding of how information flows affect and are affect by the EU’s institutional balance through synergising
perspectives from the fields of political science, public administration and law. This editorial outlines the central questions
raised in this thematic issue and highlights its main findings.
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1. Foreign Affairs and Logics of Secrecy and
Transparency
Critique on the EU’s foreign affairs has grown more per-
tinent over the last decade. Agreements like the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) or the trade ne-
gotiations with the US (TTIP) or Canada (CETA) attracted
unseen levels of public mobilisation (see also Gheyle &
De Ville, 2017). A prominent bone of contention con-
cerns the secretive nature through which many of these
initiatives originated and the lack of transparency in their
negotiations. Secrecy in the conduct of international rela-
tions is not new or unique to the EU context. The norm of
secrecy in international negotiations is historically traced
back to the timewhen royal court ambassadors had to be
constantly preoccupied by secrecy and find ways to pro-
tect their secrets (Colson, 2008). Despite public demands
for more transparency, it remains a challenge to accom-
modate such demands in light of ingrained norms of se-
crecy in the diplomatic culture (O’Reilly, 2017). Tensions
between secrecy and transparency in current foreign af-
fairs hence require closer scholarly attention.
One aspect thatmakes secrecy compelling in foreign
affairs is its protective function. Secrecy creates a space
of trust between the parties that maintain the secret
and a sense of separation from the outsiders towards
whom the secrets must be guarded (Bok, 1982). Re-
moving something from the public view endows it with
power. Often the object of secrecy—the information—
is less important than the organizational approach to
managing access to the created secrets (Simmel, 1906).
The latter empowers insiders to decide just how wide
the circle of secrecy may expand but also to influence
decision-making that involves the less informed out-
siders. Hence, a ‘“secret” is a political category, not a
natural one. Facts in isolation do not cry out for secrecy;
facts within a specific political context do’ (Chafetz,
2013, p. 86). In institutional practice, secrecy may be
used to protect information that should not be shared
widely due to legitimate concerns. Information relating
to national security or trade negotiating positions may
be justifiable reasons to limit information flows. How-
ever, from a democratic oversight perspective, secrets
should be justified and politically checkable in the broad
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sense that they are subordinate to policies that them-
selves are transparent and politically alterable (Curtin,
2014; Thompson, 1999).
This thematic issue analyses the tension between
secrecy and transparency in the EU’s foreign affairs. It
shows how debates on access to information have been
a significant driver of institutional politics and their impli-
cations for the EU’s institutional balance. Whilst negoti-
ations have a prominent role in this field, foreign affairs
also involve issues of public and institutional access to
information that are generally critical points of tensions
between executive institutions and the public and over-
sight institutions. The issue focuses on the processes of
disclosing and concealing information both among EU in-
stitutions as well as between the EU and its citizens. The
purpose of this thematic issue is to decipher how infor-
mation control affects and is affected by the EU’s insti-
tutional balance. Synergising perspectives from political
science, public administration and law, the issue offers
a critical reading of the most recent case law on these
issues and provides empirical insights on public and insti-
tutional access to information.
2. Institutional Politics and Information Control
Information is power. This also holds true in a political
and administrative context. Secrecy creates a cluster of
inside-insiders, i.e., only a limited number of individuals
knowing the secret information. This compartmentaliza-
tion of information implies that actors are involved in
an incessant competition, struggling for various stakes
and prizes (Kozak & Keagle, 1988, p. 7). In the issue, the
contributors focus on three instances where such inter-
institutional “competition” over information is particu-
larly salient.
One such relation is that between the legislature and
the executive. Transparency is an important condition for
legislative institutions to fulfil their oversight functions.
Administrative procedures governing the disclosure of in-
formation have been highlighted as important means for
legislative control over the executive (McCubbins, Noll, &
Weingast, 1987). Lack of transparency widens the infor-
mation asymmetry between the “expert” agent (who sits
at the negotiating table) and the “dilettante” principal
(who can only observe the outcome but not the actions
of the agent). Information asymmetry creates the oppor-
tunity for the negotiator to deviate from its principal’s in-
terests (Adriaensen, 2016;McCubbins& Schwartz, 1984).
The observation of such shirking or bureaucratic drift of-
ten leads to political and public protest. As information
asymmetry decreases, the scope for shirking diminishes,
as the principal is able to correct the agent’s actions. In
short, the balance of power shifts as the agent’s privately
held information diminishes (Abazi & Adriaensen, 2017;
Coremans, 2017).
Another relation where contestation over informa-
tion flows is observed concerns the relation between
(quasi-)legislative institutions. Tsebelis and Money
(1997) highlight the existence of a “political dimension”
of bicameralism. This often occurs in federal systems
where each chamber represents a different interest. It is
considered political as success for one institution often
comes at the other institutions’ expense. Both chambers
are in a continuous struggle to ensure that—ultimately—
legislation more closely reflects the interests of the elec-
torate they represent. The EU is a particularly interesting
case in this regard as historically the Council and the Eu-
ropean Parliament (EP) have not enjoyed equal rights
in decision-making. Concurrently, both institutions do
not enjoy the same degree of access to information in
foreign affairs. In policy areas where the nexus of power
remains at the national level, member states retain own-
ership of sensitive information (rather than European
institutions like the Commission or bodies like the Eu-
ropean External Action Service (EEAS). Contributions in
this issue study the tensions between the EP and the
Council as they seek to expand or maintain their grasp
on the EU’s foreign policy (Hillebrandt, 2017; Rosén &
Stie, 2017).
A third instancewhere institutional politics affect and
are affected by the transparency regime concerns the
intervention by independent bodies. Because access to
information affects the distribution of power between
the institutions, it does not come as a surprise that dis-
putes often require mediation by a (quasi-) independent
body like the European Ombudsman (EO) or the Court
of Justice of the EU. The extent to which such actors
are impartial and independent is crucial for their role in
the transparency regime. The EO is appointed by and lo-
cated within the EP. Whether this impedes its indepen-
dence role is a question addressed in the contribution by
Neuhold & Năstase (2017). The Court provides a judicial
review ensuring principles of the EU, however in foreign
affairs when public access to information is concerned it
seems to leave more discretionary space to the execu-
tive. Yet the Court seems more interventionist when par-
liamentary access to information is at stake (Abazi & Adri-
aensen, 2017). The approaches by the EO and the Court
are focused on finding a proportionate balance between
the necessities of secrecy and transparency in the EU’s
foreign policy, but as contributors in this thematic issue
show, where to strike the balance is a contentious issue.
In addition to these three instances of institutional
relations of information flows, important questions arise
about the role and position of public access to informa-
tion, debate and participation in foreign affairs. Specif-
ically, this issue examines whether institutional checks
and processes of oversight strengthen also public ac-
cess and participation and how more recent trends of
closed parliamentary oversight affect public accountabil-
ity (Abazi, 2016; Rosén & Stie, 2017). Whilst institutional
access to information strengthens the constitutional set
balance of powers among EU institutions, the issue scru-
tinises whether such processes lead to more informed
public debate and a wider participation circle for civil so-
ciety organisations.
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3. Findings and Reflections
Contributions to this thematic issue show that debates
about secrecy and transparency in foreign affairs are in-
trinsically linked to the EU’s institutional balance. Infor-
mation flows among institutions vary depending on the
constitutionally set balance, but they also determine—in
institutional practice—how the role of each institution
is evolving in the EU’s foreign affairs. Five main points
emerge from the contributions in this thematic issue.
Firstly, through a theoretical discussion and system-
atic analysis of case law, contributors challenge the as-
sumption that foreign affairs should have broader legal
contours on secrecy than internal legislation in the EU.
Leino (2017) shows that the logics of secrecy and trans-
parency are being applied both in legislation and in for-
eign policy proper and often the implications of the latter
for EU fundamental rights are just as important as such
issues that are addressed in EU legislative acts. Similarly,
Gheyle and De Ville (2017) emphasise the growing mo-
bilisation of civil society in trade negotiations due to the
regulatory nature of contemporary trade policy. Whilst
there is a growing demand for more access to informa-
tion in foreign affairs issues, participation by civil society
is yet only emerging.
Secondly, the Council shows significant resistance
towards transparency in foreign affairs both in terms
of public and institutional access to information. Hille-
brandt (2017) shows that public access to documents in
foreign affairs has been a contentious issue for the Coun-
cil and partly this is due to its overlapping diplomatic and
legislative functions. While there has been more case
law clarifying the limits of confidentiality for the Coun-
cil in foreign affairs, the Council continues to argue that
a diplomatic setting is more appropriate for its decision-
making, a setting where secrecy norms are given more
space. Rosén & Stie (2017) take the debate forward by
looking at institutional access to information and in par-
ticular showing some of the information “battles” over
access to information between the EP and the Council.
The EP has now in place a legal framework that facili-
tates access to sensitive information in foreign policy, but
this has not necessarily resulted in more straightforward
practice of access to information. In this light, Abazi and
Adriaensen (2017) show that the Council’s handling of in-
formation is not only questioned by the EP, but that the
Commission and the Council too disagree on the need for
public disclosure of important negotiating documents,
as was the case with the TTIP mandate. They also find
that the traditional divide between executive and legisla-
tive actors preferences on transparency may at times be
proven to be misleading and that the Commission has
been showing an increased support for public access to
information as far as trade negotiations are concerned.
Thirdly, the contributors address the role of demo-
cratic oversight in foreign affairs and how information
flows affect it. The main finding in this regard is that the
mere access to information in foreign affairs does not
lead to better oversight. Institutions’ attention is often
focused on obtaining access rather than the substantive
checks that follow in an oversight process. Rosén & Stie
(2017) question whether the EP’s pursuit to be informed
by the Council is contributing to public deliberation and
better parliamentary oversight in EU foreign affairs. With
respect to public access to documents, Gheyle & De
Ville (2017) argue that disagreements between the civil
society organisations and the Commission on the level
of transparency is partly explained by the definitions of
transparency applied. While for the civil society organi-
sation transparency is important as a stepping stone to
participation, the Commission implements transparency
policies merely to inform the institutions and the public.
It is clear, however, that the publication of documents
without granting CSOs a place at the table will not be suf-
ficient stifle the critiques. Naurin (2017) echoes similar
views in his commentary.
Fourthly, contributors find that information flows be-
tween the institutions are often more successful through
informal information sharing. Coremans (2017) shows
that the Commission has made significant efforts to
share information with the EP through informal means.
Several of such practices were informed by the EO’s push
for greater openness. The EO, as shown by Neuhold and
Năstase (2017), has made important moves for more
transparency through the strategic use of own initiatives
as well as through decisions in cases of public access re-
quests for information. Whether informality continues
to develop and how it will affect information flows is an
important aspect of transparency in EU foreign policy to
keep on examining more closely.
Fifthly and lastly, contributions focusing on different
dimensions of EU foreign policy laid bare several interest-
ing paths for comparative research. Trade negotiations
as an exclusive competency put the emphasis on the
Commission to provide transparency (Coremans, 2017;
Gheyle & De Ville, 2017), whereas negotiations in ar-
eas of mixed competences involve both Commission and
Council. This inevitably affects the need for information
exchange between Council and EP (Rosén & Stie, 2017).
Hence, the division of competencies in the EU affect both
the applicable institutional design as well as the institu-
tions access to information.
These findings lead to some further reflections and
open questions that merit more attention and (future)
research. One main such reflection is to what extent we
continue to see the politicisation of access to information
and institutional “battles” around access to information.
While due to many recent cases and developments, it
seems the legal contours of secrecy and transparency are
becoming more defined in the EU’s foreign affairs, infor-
mation flows will remain an inherent part of institutional
politics as information asymmetries are structurally in-
grained in foreign policy. The thematic issue clarifies that
demands for transparency have increased and solidified
(both for public and institutional access), and in fact the
supply of transparency too has witnessed shifts as noted
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regarding TTIP. But the concern regarding transparency
in foreign policy remains mostly with public access to in-
formation, with public debate, with public participation.
In fact, even in cases where civil society is active and
there is a high demand for more information, in practice,
such efforts do not seem to always translate into more
meaningful participation and debate.
This thematic issue has taken stock of secrecy and
transparency in the EU’s foreign affairs with the hope to
providemore clarity on how information control is affect-
ing the EU’s institutional politics but also to what extent
the arena of international negotiations is closed for pub-
lic debate and participation. Currently, the EU is undergo-
ing one of the most consequential negotiations in its his-
tory: amember state exiting theUnion. The Brexit negoti-
ations are to some extent unique in the EU (legal) context
when taking into account the specifics of the legal proce-
dure they invoke, the role EU institutions and member
states play, and of course their political implications. Yet,
the Brexit negotiations share many of the features that
are common in negotiation in foreign affairs, not least
of which are the dynamics of secrecy and transparency
as documented by the contribution of the European Om-
budsman (O’Reilly, 2017). Do parliaments receive infor-
mation on a timely basis of what has been discussed be-
hind closed doors? Howdobureaucracies exert influence
onnegotiations through the use of secrecy?Does secrecy
help negotiators to exchange views in candour? Through
this thematic issue we hope to inform these debates and
provide more insights towards these answers.
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